An Answer to
Machine Politics?
How a DSA socialist beat the establishment Democrat in working-class immigrant neighborhoods
An Answer Democrats Were Looking For?
Our “Machine Politician” analysis revealed immigrant communities swinging 20+ points toward Trump in 2024—the same neighborhoods where Democrats have been hemorrhaging support. Then something unexpected happened: a DSA socialist named Zohran Mamdani won the Democratic mayoral primary by dominating those exact same communities.
He didn't win by moving to the center. He didn't win by abandoning progressive policies. He won by showing up, speaking their language, and leading with material concerns. Not ideology. Not lecturing. Presence.
A Note on Comparisons
This piece compares Mamdani's performance to Cuomo's in the same race—an apples-to-apples comparison. We use 2024 presidential data as context to show which communities are trending Republican, not to claim Mamdani “won back” Trump voters. Different elections, different electorates.
The Mamdani Model
1. Spoke Gujarati at mosques—not translation, presence
2. Led with housing costs and workers' rights, not culture war signaling
3. Treated culturally conservative immigrants as economically rational actors
4. Cross-endorsed with Brad Lander to capture ranked-choice overflow
The result? A coalition that defied conventional wisdom: Park Slope progressives and Jackson Heights immigrants, DSA activists and working-class Muslims, progressive organizers and culturally conservative voters. He proved that immigrant communities aren't ideologically captured—they'reideologically available to whoever shows up, speaks their language, and addresses their material concerns.
Mamdani vs Cuomo: Two Different Coalitions
Mamdani's coalition looked nothing like Andrew Cuomo's. The former governor dominated wealthy Manhattan and traditional Democratic establishment strongholds—the voters who wanted stability over change. Mamdani won by running up massive margins in progressive neighborhoods and—crucially—outperforming expectations in working-class outer boroughs where Democrats have been losing ground.
| Borough | ADs | Mamdani % | Cuomo % | Margin | 2024 Pres. (Context) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Staten Island | 4 | 23.1% | 55.3% | C+32.2 | R+29 |
| Queens | 18 | 48.2% | 41.6% | M+6.6 | D+24 |
| Brooklyn | 22 | 57.5% | 36.9% | M+20.7 | D+43 |
| Bronx | 11 | 51.9% | 40.3% | M+11.6 | D+45 |
| Manhattan | 13 | 52.9% | 43.2% | M+9.7 | D+64 |
Source: akashic.nyc_mayoral_results_2025 | 2024 presidential shown for context only (different electorate)
Manhattan went for Mamdani by just under M+10—respectable, but not dominant. The Upper East Side and Upper West Side went heavily for Cuomo, the establishment candidate who promised continuity. These are the wealthiest, most educated neighborhoods in America, and they chose the known quantity.
But in Queens' working-class districts—the same neighborhoods trending Republican nationally—Mamdani dominated. In specific immigrant-heavy communities, he won by margins that shocked political observers: 15-20+ point victories against a former governor.
Where Mamdani Beat Cuomo in Working-Class Queens
These Assembly Districts are working-class, immigrant-heavy neighborhoods where Mamdani's economic populism resonated. The Democrats in these communities chose the socialist over the establishment candidate by double-digit margins.
| AD | Borough | Mamdani % | Cuomo % | Margin | Community |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 30 | Queens | 53.9% | 35.3% | M+18.6 | South Ozone Park/Richmond Hill |
| 38 | Queens | 54.3% | 33.7% | M+20.6 | Ridgewood |
| 39 | Queens | 52.7% | 36.9% | M+15.8 | Howard Beach/Ozone Park |
| 31 | Queens | 56.4% | 37.2% | M+19.2 | Maspeth/Middle Village |
| 32 | Queens | 58.1% | 38.1% | M+20.0 | Sunnyside/Woodside |
| 33 | Queens | 55.6% | 37.4% | M+18.2 | Corona/Jackson Heights |
Source: akashic.nyc_mayoral_results_2025
South Ozone Park, Richmond Hill, Ridgewood, Corona, Jackson Heights—these are working-class, immigrant-heavy, economically stressed communities where Democrats have been losing support. Mamdani won them all by 15-20+ points against Cuomo.
Why did Mamdani win the Democratic voters there? The answer is deceptively simple: He showed up. He made specific promises about housing and wages. He spoke their languages—literally, in Gujarati at mosques. He treated them as constituencies to negotiate with, not demographics to claim or lecture.
The Trade-Off: Who Went to Cuomo
Mamdani's coalition came with costs. He lost ground in two key Democratic constituencies: wealthy white liberals and older Black voters aligned with the traditional party establishment.
Cuomo's Strongest Assembly Districts
| AD | Borough | Mamdani % | Cuomo % | Margin | Community |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 73 | Manhattan | 30.7% | 65.7% | C+35.0 | Upper East Side |
| 76 | Manhattan | 40.8% | 55.6% | C+14.8 | Upper West Side |
| 61 | Manhattan | 40.5% | 55.1% | C+14.6 | Murray Hill |
| 41 | Brooklyn | 28.2% | 61.6% | C+33.4 | Sunset Park (Chinese) |
| 27 | Queens | 29.0% | 58.0% | C+28.9 | Flushing (Chinese/Korean) |
| 26 | Queens | 28.8% | 56.6% | C+27.8 | Bayside/Douglaston |
| 23 | Queens | 26.1% | 53.5% | C+27.4 | Eastern Queens |
Source: akashic.nyc_mayoral_results_2025
Upper East Side (AD-73) went for Cuomo by 35 points. Upper West Side (AD-76) went Cuomo by 15. These are the wealthiest, most educated neighborhoods in America—and they wanted the establishment candidate.
The pattern in Black neighborhoods reveals a crucial nuance. Mamdani won them—but often by smaller margins than in progressive Brooklyn. Co-op City (AD-83) went M+15, Brownsville (AD-58) went M+27, East New York (AD-60) went M+18—all comfortable wins, but not the 50-point blowouts of Park Slope. The traditional Black political establishment largely backed Cuomo, yet Mamdani still won these communities. That alone is historically significant.
The Historical Significance
That Mamdani won Black voters at all is genuinely novel. This isn't just about national primaries—look at this same race, this same opponent.
In 2018, Cuomo crushed Cynthia Nixon 83-17 in the Bronx. His support was described as “off the charts in predominantly Black neighborhoods in Brooklyn, southeast Queens, and the Bronx.” In 2014, Zephyr Teachout faced the same wall—doing best in “whiter, gentrified parts” of the city while Cuomo dominated everywhere else.
Nationally, the pattern holds. Bernie Sanders swept the first three 2020 contests—Biden came 4th in Iowa, 5th in New Hampshire, 2nd in Nevada. Then South Carolina: Sanders couldn't crack 20% with Black voters while Biden coasted to 48.7%. Even Tom Steyer got 11.3%.
Black voters have been the firewall that stops progressive insurgencies. Mamdani broke through it—not everywhere, but enough to win a citywide race against the same opponent who crushed Nixon and Teachout.
The Cuomo Coalition
Cuomo consolidated three groups: wealthy Manhattan liberals who wanted stability, older Black voters aligned with the traditional Democratic establishment, and Orthodox Jewish communities who went 80%+ for Cuomo in Borough Park and Williamsburg.
| AD | Borough | Mamdani % | Cuomo % | Margin | Community |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 48 | Brooklyn | 11.2% | 83.8% | C+72.6 | Borough Park (Hasidic) |
| 45 | Brooklyn | 16.0% | 76.2% | C+60.3 | Williamsburg (Hasidic) |
| 62 | Staten Island | 11.6% | 62.4% | C+50.8 | South Shore |
| 64 | Staten Island | 19.0% | 58.1% | C+39.1 | Mid-Island |
| 73 | Manhattan | 30.7% | 65.7% | C+35.0 | Upper East Side |
Source: akashic.nyc_mayoral_results_2025
Borough Park (AD-48) gave Cuomo 84% of the vote. Staten Island went Cuomo by 32-51 points depending on the AD. The Upper East Side gave Cuomo 66%.
These are very different groups united by one thing: they didn't want disruption. The Orthodox community wanted someone who wouldn't challenge their institutions. The wealthy wanted someone who wouldn't raise their taxes. The party establishment wanted one of their own. Cuomo was the safe choice.
The Caveat: Different Voters, Same Neighborhoods
Before drawing national lessons, we need to be honest about what this data can and cannot tell us. Mamdani won a Democratic primary. The voters who swung to Trump in 2024 are largely not the same people who voted in a Democratic mayoral contest.
The Electorate Problem
In neighborhoods like Borough Park (AD-48), Trump won by 70 points in 2024. In the mayoral race, Cuomo crushed Mamdani there 84-11. Same geography, but clearly different voters showed up for each election.
The people who swung from Obama to Trump aren't participating in Democratic primaries—they've left the party. Mamdani's coalition is the Democrats who remained.
This matters because it limits what national Democrats can learn. Mamdani didn't “win back” Trump voters—he won Democratic primary voters in neighborhoods where the overall electorate has shifted right. Those are different accomplishments.
But Geography Rhymes
And yet—rhymes are noted for a reason. People who live in the same neighborhoods share more than an address. They shop at the same stores, worship at the same mosques and churches, send their kids to the same schools, complain about the same landlords. Their concerns overlap even when their voting behavior diverges.
What We Know
- • Queens swung R+21 from 2020→2024 (presidential)
- • Working-class immigrant areas led the swing
- • The remaining Democrats in these areas chose Mamdani
- • Economic messaging + physical presence worked
What We Don't Know
- • Would the same approach work in a general election?
- • Are the concerns of Dem-primary voters shared by those who left?
- • Is Mamdani's coalition replicable outside NYC?
- • Does “showing up” scale nationally?
The honest answer is: we don't know yet. Mamdani's approach—presence over polling, economics over identity, specific promises to specific communities—worked in a Democratic primary. Whether it can reach the voters who've already left the party is a different question, one this election can't answer.
But shared geography creates shared experience. The immigrant family that voted for Mamdani and the immigrant family next door that voted for Trump both face the same rent increases, the same transit delays, the same school overcrowding. If Mamdani's approach resonates with one, it might resonate with the other. That's not proof. It's a hypothesis worth testing.
Explore the Results: Precinct-Level Map
The interactive map in the sidebar shows how every Election District voted. Toggle between winner view and margin view to see the geographic patterns—Mamdani's strength in progressive Brooklyn, Cuomo's dominance in Orthodox neighborhoods and wealthy Manhattan.
Using the Map
The map updates as you scroll through each section, highlighting the relevant neighborhoods. Hover over any precinct to see detailed results. You can also pan and zoom to explore—the map will snap back when you continue scrolling.
Education and the Asian Vote: The Gifted Program Divide
One of Cuomo's most effective attacks on Mamdani was his opposition to gifted and talented programs in public schools. This landed hardest in Chinese-American communities, where academic achievement pathways are deeply valued and fiercely defended as essential mechanisms of upward mobility.
The results reveal a stark split within “Asian” voters—a group that pundits often treat as monolithic.Chinese-dominant districts went heavily for Cuomo (by 28-33 points), whileSouth Asian districts actually went for Mamdani. The difference? Education policy.
| AD | Community | Mamdani | Cuomo | Margin | 2024 Pres. (Context) | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 27 | Chinese/Korean | 29.0% | 58.0% | C+28.9 | R+8 | Flushing - gifted program epicenter |
| 41 | Chinese | 28.2% | 61.6% | C+33.4 | R+4 | Sunset Park Chinatown |
| 26 | Chinese | 28.8% | 56.6% | C+27.8 | D+5 | Bayside/Douglaston |
| 23 | Chinese/Korean | 26.1% | 53.5% | C+27.4 | R+13 | Eastern Queens/Bellerose |
| 25 | Chinese/Mixed | 34.7% | 54.5% | C+19.8 | D+1 | Whitestone/College Point |
| 40 | Chinese | 36.4% | 49.5% | C+13.0 | R+2 | Fresh Meadows |
| 35 | Chinese/South Asian | 44.4% | 47.3% | C+2.9 | D+14 | Elmhurst - swing district |
| 24 | South Asian | 51.2% | 40.2% | M+11.1 | D+19 | Jamaica/Briarwood - Indo-Caribbean |
| 49 | South Asian/Russian | 35.1% | 48.8% | C+13.7 | R+20 | Sheepshead Bay/Midwood |
Source: akashic.nyc_mayoral_results_2025, v_nyc_pres_vs_mayor_2024_2025 | 2024 pres. shown for context (different electorate)
Chinese-Dominant Districts
- • AD-27 (Flushing): Cuomo +29 — Epicenter of gifted program defense
- • AD-41 (Sunset Park): Cuomo +33 — Brooklyn's Chinatown
- • AD-26 (Bayside): Cuomo +28
- → Education policy was decisive here
South Asian Districts
- • AD-24 (Jamaica/Briarwood): Mamdani +11 — Indo-Caribbean community
- • AD-35 (Elmhurst): Cuomo +3 — Mixed, essentially tied
- • Economic populism resonated more than education fears
- → Mamdani's outreach worked here
Why Gifted Programs Matter So Much
For many Chinese-American families, the specialized high school exam and gifted programs represent the one genuinely meritocratic pathway into elite institutions—a pathway that doesn't depend on expensive extracurriculars, legacy connections, or “holistic” admissions criteria that can disadvantage Asian applicants.
When Mamdani positioned himself against these programs, he wasn't just opposing an educational policy—he was threatening a core mechanism of upward mobility for families who had built their American dream around academic achievement.
David Shor, Head of Data Science at Blue Rose Research, has flagged removing advanced classes as “literally the single most unpopular thing Democrats can talk about.”
The Cuomo campaign hammered this relentlessly in Flushing and Sunset Park—and it worked decisively. The question for Democrats is whether progressive education policy can be reconciled with communities where meritocratic academic pathways are non-negotiable. The data suggests it cannot, at least not without losing those voters.
The Governance Question: Cea Weaver and the Free Services Debate
Mamdani's victory brings his coalition into power—and with it, questions about governance. His appointment of tenant advocate Cea Weaver to lead the Mayor's Office to Protect Tenants surfaced old social media posts that crystalize the tension between progressive activists and working-class immigrant voters.
The Cea Weaver Controversy
Deleted posts from Weaver's social media accounts reemerged after her appointment:
- • Called homeownership “a weapon of white supremacy masquerading as 'wealth building' public policy” (2019)
- • Called to “impoverish the white middle class” (2018)
- • Celebrated the government's “sacred right to seize private property”
- • Called to “elect more communists” (2017)
Former Mayor Eric Adams responded: “Homeownership is how immigrants, Black, Brown, and working-class New Yorkers built stability and generational wealth despite every obstacle.”
For immigrant communities who scraped together down payments on small homes in Queens—who see property ownership as the tangible proof of their American success—rhetoric calling homeownership “white supremacy” isn't academic theory. It's an attack on their life's work, their American dream, their generational wealth-building strategy.
This is exactly the kind of rhetoric that drove the 2020-2024 immigrant swing to Trump. Mamdani won despite his association with this wing of progressive politics—but governing with figures who use this language may test the coalition that brought him to power. The voters who delivered his victory may not tolerate the rhetoric that energizes DSA meetings.
The Free Services Question
Beyond the inflammatory rhetoric lies a more substantive policy debate: does making public services free actually serve the communities that use them?
The Progressive Case
- • Fees are regressive—hurt the poor most
- • Universal services build solidarity
- • Means-testing adds bureaucracy and stigma
- • Public goods should be public
The Investment Argument
- • People value what they invest in
- • Some fee creates ownership mentality
- • Free services attract abuse, not investment
- • Working-class immigrants already pay—they want services that work
The immigrant voters who backed Mamdani aren't ideological about this—they're practical. They want housing they can afford, transit that works, schools that prepare their kids. Whether services are free or subsidized matters less than whether they're functional.
The tension is clear: Mamdani won by showing up in working-class immigrant neighborhoods and talking about rent and wages. But governing means appointing people—and appointing activists who call homeownership “white supremacy” sends a very different message to the Queens homeowners who delivered his victory. The rhetoric that energizes progressive base voters may alienate the exact communities that made his coalition possible.
Whether Mamdani can manage this tension—keeping both DSA activists and South Asian small homeowners in his coalition—will determine whether his mayoralty succeeds or fractures. The campaign is over. Now comes the harder part.
What This Might Mean for Democrats
Mamdani's victory is suggestive, not conclusive. It offers a hypothesis, not a proven formula.
The hopeful reading: Among Democrats who remain in working-class immigrant neighborhoods, Mamdani's approach—presence, economic messaging, linguistic and cultural fluency—outperformed establishment politics by double digits. If shared geography creates shared concerns, this approach might resonate beyond primary voters.
The cautionary reading: Mamdani won a Democratic primary with historically low turnout. The voters who swung to Trump aren't participating in Democratic primaries—they've left the party entirely. Winning the remaining loyalists doesn't prove you can win back the departed.
What We Can Say
Mamdani's coalition—DSA progressives plus working-class immigrants plus Black voters skeptical of establishment politics—is internally coherent in a way Democrats haven't seen in a while.
Whether it's transferable to general elections, or to contexts outside NYC, remains untested. But the components—presence, economics, specificity—are at least worth studying.
Mamdani is a DSA socialist who won conservative Muslim neighborhoods in a Democratic primary. He did it by being present and making specific promises about things they actually cared about: housing, wages, cost of living. Not by abandoning his principles—by finding where his principles and their concerns overlapped.
Can this translate nationally? Can it reach voters who've stopped voting Democratic entirely? We genuinely don't know. But in a party searching for answers after 2024, Mamdani's approach is at least a coherent theory of the case—one that produced a win in the nation's largest city. Whether it's more than that remains to be seen.
The Cuomo Curse: Father and Son
There's an eerie historical parallel here that deepens the meaning of this race. Andrew Cuomo's defeat by a progressive insurgent isn't just a 2025 story—it's a generational echo.
Mario Cuomo, 1977
Lost to Ed Koch in Democratic primary
Mario Cuomo, then Secretary of State, ran for NYC Mayor in 1977. He lost the Democratic primary runoff to Ed Koch 45-55%.
Refusing to accept defeat, Mario ran in the general election on the Liberal Party line and came within 9 points of winning—finishing with 41.1% to Koch's 50.0%.
Andrew Cuomo, 2025
Lost to Zohran Mamdani in Democratic primary
Andrew Cuomo, disgraced former governor attempting a comeback, lost the Democratic mayoral primary to Zohran Mamdani, who ran on progressive economics and Gaza opposition.
Like his father, Andrew refused to accept the result and ran in the general election on third-party lines—with nearly identical results.
The Eerie Parallel
48 years apart, father and son both lost NYC Democratic mayoral primaries, both refused to accept the result, both ran third-party general election campaigns, and both ended up with strikingly similar results: Mario got 41.1%, Andrew got 41.3%. The Cuomo political instinct—ambition over party loyalty—appears to be hereditary.
For Mario, 1977 was a beginning. He bounced back from the mayoral loss to become one of New York's most celebrated governors—his whole career still ahead of him. For Andrew, 2025 was an ending. He'd already had his turn at Albany: three terms before resigning in disgrace in 2021. The mayoral race was supposed to be his comeback. Instead, history repeated itself—another Cuomo, another third-party campaign, another 41%. Except this time, there's no second act.
Mamdani proved something works—in a Democratic primary.
Presence over polling. Economics over identity. Specific promises to specific communities.
Whether this formula can reach voters who've already left the party
is a question this election can't answer.
But in neighborhoods where Democrats are bleeding support, the voters who stayed chose the socialist over the establishment candidate. That's not nothing. It's a hypothesis worth testing.
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